Showing posts with label Oakland County. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Oakland County. Show all posts

Saturday, July 14, 2018

Utilize Green Infrastructure in Great Lakes Areas of Concern

Part of the reason why remediation of a legacy of industrial pollution identified as Areas of Concern (AOCs) in the St. Clair River-Detroit River corridor is taking decades to achieve is the over-reliance on concrete and steel projects where green infrastructure would be more effective.

For example, as a means of stormwater control, public and private interests in New York City (including one auto company, Toyota) determined to plant a million trees in 10 years. They achieved that goal in eight years.

In the metro Detroit area (home of three auto companies), large-scale tree planting has been forsaken out of preference for huge concrete and steel projects like the so-called retention-treatment basins (RTBs). Nevertheless, downstream pollution, including sedimentation and turbidity, continues to be problematic.
Kuhn RTB - Oakland County, Michigan


One such, the massive Kuhn RTB (formerly known as Twelve Towns) in Oakland County, recently expanded, continues to divert partially screened and treated, sediment-laden surges down the Red Run Drain to the Clinton River and on to Lake St. Clair when overwhelmed by heavy rainstorms, instead of pumping the effluent to the Detroit Wastewater Treatment Plant as usual.

Better water quality in Great Lakes AOCs can be hastened by greater reliance on green infrastructure.










Thursday, November 20, 2014

The Duty of Enforcement Agencies to Inspect Construction Site Runoff

Third in a Series
The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) had written me (see yesterday’s post),
“The Part 91 agency is required to enforce Part 91, as appropriate, when they become aware of unpermitted sites that are failing to comply with Part 91.  Citizen tips, like yours, identifying noncompliance on unpermitted sites are often how Part 91 agencies become aware of this non-compliance if they have not personally driven by the site.”
I wrote back on November 12, 2014, in part:
I’m troubled by this “when they become aware” and “if they have not personally driven by” standard.  Isn’t there an affirmative duty on the part of a Part 91 [municipal or county] agency to have a representative visit these sites routinely to determine whether or not the [erosion control] statute is being violated?  
Consider that, in all of these cases, the municipality will have a building inspector at the site on a  regular basis throughout the construction process. The building inspector can monitor disturbed soil erosion. It doesn’t take any special expertise to recognize evidence of silt runoff.
Neither MDEQ nor CEAs nor MEAs should rely on the chance that casual passersby will report violations.
So far, MDEQ hasn’t responded.
An October 2003 revision to Oakland County’s Soil Erosion Program provides:

“Each site classification has an associated inspection frequency as indicated on the following table.”


Class
Description
Inspection Frequency
Class 5          
Project on a lake/ stream/ wetland/ open water of any kind and has a slope or discharge to these waters.
2 weeks
Class 4  
Project on a lake/ stream/ wetland/ open water of any kind and has no slope (2% or less)
3 weeks
Class 3  
Project is on a dry/wet detention basin with a sediment filter or on a retention pond
6 weeks
Class 2
Project is over 225 square feet and does not meet the requirements found in above Classes
7 weeks
Class 1
Minor Changes under 225 square feet of disturbance:  additions, decks, etc.
8 weeks

The positions of the state and county depend on the false assumption that silt runoff from construction sites into municipal sewers does no significant harm.  That assumption overlooks the loss of topsoil at the construction site and the costly consequences of sediment in the sewers, at the wastewater treatment plant and in natural water bodies receiving combined sewer overflows (CSOs).  
Those results are ongoing violations of the national Clean Water Act.  EPA and MDEQ ought to revisit this subject and require more frequent inspections and more stringent sanctions for violations.
*****   *****   *****
Next: Bringing the Issue into Focus with a FOIA Request

Monday, August 11, 2014

DWSD and CSOs: Bad Choices, Second Chances

Heavy rainstorms cause sewer overflows that pollute lakes and streams. Attempting to control overflows in the Rouge River watershed, officials are constructing or expanding a series of impoundments called retention treatment basins that are intended to hold back a small, initial surge of polluted stormwater for subsequent primary and secondary treatment.  The remainder of the deluge is to be screened, dosed with chlorine (primary treatment) and released to the river, still laden with many pollutants.

The question raised here is whether building one or two small, full-service wastewater treatment plants in the Rouge watershed would provide greater amounts of clean water while simultaneously reducing the occasional overflows that overwhelm the massive treatment plant in Detroit at the same or even lower cost than the retention treatment basins.

Don’t confuse the following with expert analysis.  I’m struggling to understand by what reasoning federal, state and local officials think they are implementing clean water legislation concerning combined sewer overflows (CSOs) by building new or expanding existing retention treatment basins (RTBs).  It doesn’t make sense to me.

The Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) central wastewater treatment plant is a mammoth facility intended to serve a large swath of metropolitan Detroit.  Difficulties arise when heavy rainstorms inundate the sewer system.

Major portions of metropolitan Detroit’s sewer system consist of combined sewers that carry both storm runoff and sanitary sewage.  Every time there’s a long, heavy downpour, hundreds of millions of gallons of untreated or partially treated wastewater are diverted to tributaries of Lake St. Clair and the Detroit River in order to avoid flooding basements and swamping the treatment plant.

That means that harmful levels of toxins, pathogens, nutrients and sediment contaminate natural bodies of water.

One would think that the simple solution to combined sewer overflows would be to expand the Detroit wastewater treatment plant.  There are three reasons why that wouldn’t  work:

  • The plant is way too big and unmanageable already.
  • There’s no more room on site.
  • Detroit can’t afford it.

Several years ago, federal and state officials proposed the construction of huge tunnels to hold CSOs temporarily, but Detroit couldn’t afford that, either.

Next, city and state officials came up with a plan to build new or expand existing retention treatment basins, nine in total, in the Rouge River watershed to control CSOs.  

Each RTB would have two tanks.  After screening debris, the first tank would be filled with the initial surge of polluted stormwater, expected to contain the most pollutants (the so-called first flush), and held for eventual pumping to the Detroit plant for primary and secondary treatment.

The second tank would hold subsequent, less polluted flow, which would be chlorinated (primary treatment) and, if the inflow continued beyond the second tank’s capacity, would be discharged, still containing (1) toxins, (2) such sediment as hadn’t settled in the tank, (3) so much of the pathogens as survived the chlorine, and (4) so much of the nutrients as hadn’t clumped up with chlorination, into the Rouge River.

The cost of these nine new or expanded CSO control facilities was expected (2009) to be $479 million.


If each of the nine facilities diverts from the plant to the river nine million gallons per day (mgd) of partially treated overflow, that would trim the treatment plant’s overload by 91 mgd.

But wait just a minute!   An Oakland County study in 2007 suggested an intriguing series of water-related alternatives, including wastewater treatment.  

One alternative deemed cost effective was to build a new wastewater treatment plant on the Clinton River near Mound Rd., north of 22 Mile Rd.  It would reduce both normal flow to DWSD’s plant in Detroit and diversion of polluted CSOs to the Clinton River.   

The proposed plant would handle an average 52.8 mgd with a maximum of 102 mgd.  The cost was estimated (2007) at $275 million.


A new plant like that, built on the Rouge River, would (a) not be limited to diverting partially treated stormwater from the Detroit treatment plant to the river, as would the nine RTBs, but would relieve the Detroit plant daily of up to 102 mgd, and (b) at about 60% of the cost.

Imagine the reduction of CSOs and the Detroit plant’s ordinary load if new plants as described in the Oakland study were built on both the Clinton River and the Rouge River.

Coulda, shoulda, woulda?  Why bring this up now?  Because, these are recurring opportunities. The equipment that goes into these plants takes a beating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.  It wears out fast.  It can be repaired only so often before it has to be replaced.

As we move toward a regional water authority, we would be well advised to gradually replace segments of the Detroit wastewater treatment plant with new, smaller, more efficient and better managed treatment plants throughout the region.

Tuesday, May 20, 2014

How NOT to Plan a New Suburban Water System

Distrustful of Detroit’s intentions toward its wholesale customers in the suburbs concerning future water services, Oakland and Macomb counties are considering building their own freshwater intake, treatment and distribution system.

Steps have been taken to study the feasibility of creating a new regional authority that would draw water from Lake St. Clair, treat it and pipe it westward across the two counties.

A similar plan in Chicago’s southern suburbs is a cautionary tale.

In 2011, seven small Chicago suburbs (Alsip, Blue Island, Calumet Park, Harvey, Markham, Midlothian and Robbins), dissatisfied with the rapidly increasing cost of Chicago water, formed an agency to study and plan their own water system.

The South Suburban Joint Action Water Agency borrowed $5.6 million in 2012 to determine feasibility and plan for construction, which was expected to cost $300 million and take three years.

To date, the agency is thought to have spent all but $1 million, and they haven’t even determined the intake site yet.

Major portions of the spending thus far have gone in no-bid contracts to cronies and/or political campaign contributors of the municipal officials running the agency.

Most of the small towns involved are deeply in debt to Chicago for past water consumption.  The $5.6 million meant to finance planning is expected to double by the time the bonds mature.  These are not terribly prosperous communities, but their taxpayers and ratepayers will have to take the hit as the result of the careless, reckless or corrupt spending of community leaders.

Obviously, the circumstances in Detroit’s northern suburbs are significantly different.  The caliber of governance is higher.  The communities are more numerous and many of them enjoy fiscal health. Nevertheless, transparency in contracting and spending should be a high priority as studies about a new water system progress.

Sunday, February 2, 2014

Can a Metro Detroit Water Deal Exclude Oakland and Macomb?



Concerning an anticipated metro Detroit water deal that would exclude Oakland and Macomb counties, reported in the Detroit Free Press* on January 22, 2014 by John Wisely:


How likely is it that Gov. Snyder, having in mind a re-election bid, would risk losing Republican campaign money and votes in Oakland and Macomb counties by siding exclusively with 99 percent Democratic Detroit and Wayne County’s discredited executive, a Democrat, on a water pact?

* http://www.freep.com/article/20140122/NEWS05/301220028/detroit-water-sewerage-department-suburbs-cooperation-deal